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Summary: Traditional historiography tends to draw a negative picture of British 
doctors’ ethics during the long nineteenth century. Medical professional ethics of 
this period has been described as self-serving and as a tool to monopolize the 
healthcare market. In this paper I attempt to challenge this rather one-sided view 
by looking into evidence for the practice of medical ethics, not just its normative 
texts. Focusing on the disciplinary function of the General Medical Council and 
discussing a variety of its cases, from fraudulent registration, sexual misconduct 
and breach of confidence to negligence, covering of unqualified assistants and 
advertising, I argue that nineteenth-century medical ethics aimed at supporting 
the interests of patients and of the public at large as well as the reputation of the 
profession. 
 
Keywords: medical ethics, medical discipline, General Medical Council, medical 
profession, United Kingdom  
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Introduction 
 
Medical ethics in Britain during the long nineteenth century tends to have a bad 
name among scholars. Jeffrey Berlant and Ivan Waddington have claimed that 
doctors’ ethics in that period was self-serving, aiming more at supporting the 
interests of the profession than at protecting patients. In particular they have 
suggested that regular doctors used ethics as a strategy to demarcate 
themselves from unlicensed and unorthodox practitioners and as an instrument 
to mitigate competition within their profession by focusing on rules for maintaining 
smooth intra-professional relationships between physicians, surgeons and 
apothecaries, and between consultants and general practitioners. Furthermore, 
medical ethics was characterised as a trust-inducing device vis-à-vis the public 
and as a tool for monopolisation of the healthcare market.1 In addition, 
bioethicists Laurence McCullough and Robert Veatch have suggested that after 
promising beginnings in the late eighteenth century, British medical ethics lost its 
way: while the well-known lectures of Edinburgh professor of medicine John 
Gregory on the duties and qualifications of a physician of 1772 had been 
influenced by contemporary Scottish Common Sense philosophy, so the 
                                                 
1 Jeffrey Lionel Berlant, Profession and Monopoly: A Study of Medicine in the United States and 
Great Britain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 68-81; Ivan Waddington, ‘The 
Development of Medical Ethics – A Sociological Analysis’, Medical History, 1975, 19, 36-51; 
idem, The Medical Profession in the Industrial Revolution (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984), 153-
175. See also Anne Digby, Making a Medical Living: Doctors and Patients in the English Market 
for Medicine, 1720-1911 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 59-62.  
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argument goes, subsequent writers on medical ethics got too much embroiled in 
intra-professional issues and lost the connection with moral philosophy.2 
 
Only occasionally this negative picture of medical ethics in the long nineteenth-
century has been qualified in some respects. For example, reinterpreting Thomas 
Percival’s influential text Medical Ethics of 1803, which had been blamed, since 
Chauncey Leake’s edition of 1927, for having promoted an intra-professional 
focus over attention to doctor-patient relations, Robert Baker has identified 
elements in it that seem to reflect contemporary social contract theory.3 Duncan 
Wilson has recently highlighted English physician Jukes Styrap, author of a late 
nineteenth-century code of medical ethics, as an example of a writer who 
emphasized a link between professional and public interest by arguing that 
patients were best served by trusting a unified medical profession that was 
clearly distinct from ‘tradesmen and quacks’.4 Similarly, Andrew Morrice has 
                                                 
2 John Gregory, Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician (London: W. Strahan 
and T. Cadell, 1772); Laurence B. McCullough, John Gregory and the Invention of Professional 
Medical Ethics and the Profession of Medicine (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998); 
Robert M. Veatch, Disrupted Dialogue: Medical Ethics and the Collapse of Physician-Humanist 
Communication (1770-1980) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). See also Lisbeth 
Haakonssen, Medicine and Morals in the Enlightenment: John Gregory, Thomas Percival and 
Benjamin Rush (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997).     
3 Robert Baker, ‘Deciphering Percival’s Code’, in idem, Dorothy Porter and Roy Porter, eds, The 
Codification of Medical Morality, vol. 1: Medical Ethics and Etiquette in the Eighteenth Century 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 179-211; Thomas Percival, ‘Medical Ethics: Or, 
A Code of Institutes and Precepts, Adapted to the Professional Conduct of Physicians and 
Surgeons’ (1803), in C. D. Leake, ed., Percival’s Medical Ethics (Huntington, NY: Robert E. 
Krieger Publishing Company, 1975), 61-205. See also Gary S. Belkin, ‘History and bioethics: The 
uses of Thomas Percival’, Medical Humanities Review, 1998, 12, 39-59, who gives a variety of 
interpretations of Percival as learned gentleman, philosopher, and political actor. 
4 Duncan Wilson, The Making of British Bioethics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2014), 29; Jukes Styrap, A Code of Medical Ethics: With Remarks on the Duties of Practitioners 
to their Patients, and the Obligations of Patients to their Medical Advisers: also on the Duties of 
the Profession to the Public, and the Obligations of the Public to the Faculty (London: J. & A. 
Churchill, 1878). See also Peter Bartrip, ‘An Introduction to Jukes Styrap’s A Code of Medical 
Ethics (1878)’, in Robert Baker, ed., The Codification of Medical Morality, vol. 2: Anglo-American 
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found that doctors involved in the ethical work of the British Medical Association 
during the early twentieth century described professional interests and public 
interests as interlinked.5  
 
Moreover, Roger Cooter has suggested that one should not adopt unreservedly 
Berlant’s and Waddington’s characterisations of the historical medical profession, 
because at the time of their writing, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the emergence 
of an apparently lay-driven bioethics would have stimulated them to focus on, 
and criticize, the self-interested features of the professional ethics of medical 
men.6  Historical accounts of the rise of bioethics during the second half of the 
twentieth century, especially by the field’s pioneers, have indeed emphasized the 
role of non-medical protagonists, such as theologians, philosophers and lawyers, 
who were keen to put patient and public interests into the foreground of debates 
on ethics in medicine.7 Bioethicists who wished to demarcate the ‘old’ medical 
ethics from their ‘new’ interdisciplinary ethics may have unwittingly distorted 
historical perspectives by paying too little attention to the patient-related aspects 
of doctors’ traditional ethics.8             
                                                                                                                                                 
Medical Ethics and Medical Jurisprudence in the Nineteenth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1995), 145-148.  
5 Andrew A. G. Morrice, ‘”Honour and Interests”: Medical Ethics and the British Medical 
Association’, in Andreas-Holger Maehle and Johanna Geyer-Kordesch, eds, Historical and 
Philosophical Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics: From Paternalism to Autonomy? (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2002), 11-35, on 15. 
6 Roger Cooter with Claudia Stein, Writing History in the Age of Biomedicine (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2013), 175. 
7 Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); 
Daniel Callahan, In Search of the Good: A Life in Bioethics (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT 
Press, 2012); David J. Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics 
Transformed Medical Decision Making (BasicBooks USA, 1991).   
8 For a critical assessment of the rise of bioethics and the ‘bioethicists’ tale’ see Roger Cooter, 
‘The Ethical Body’, in idem and John Pickstone, eds, Companion to Medicine in the Twentieth 
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Going beyond these qualifications and criticisms of the traditional view of 
nineteenth-century medical ethics, I seek to further challenge it by looking into 
evidence for the contemporary practice of medical ethics (rather than just its 
normative texts) within a state-authorized system for the control of doctors’ 
conduct in the United Kingdom. To what extent did nineteenth-century medical 
ethics, as a practice, support interests of patients and the public at large? What 
was the relationship between professional interests and patients’ interests? My 
focus is the disciplinary function of the General Council of Medical Education and 
Registration (nowadays known as the General Medical Council or GMC), which 
was established through an Act of Parliament in 1858. As historian Michael 
Roberts has shown in his analysis of the genesis of this Act, three major factors 
contributed to this piece of medical reform: a drive towards professional 
representation from the rising group of general practitioners at a time when the 
old tripartite structure distinguishing physicians, surgeons and apothecaries was 
becoming dysfunctional; a public interest in ensuring competency and 
honourable behaviour of medical practitioners, a task which traditionally lay in the 
hands of the medical corporations (royal colleges); and the state’s interest in 
qualified medical service in public health and under the terms of the Poor Law of 
1834.9 Besides its role in monitoring standards of medical education, the General 
Council was given the task to maintain a Register of practitioners holding 
                                                                                                                                                 
Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 451-468. See also Gary S. Belkin, ‘Moving 
Beyond Bioethics: history and the search for medical humanism’, Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine, 47, 2004, 372-85. 
9 Michael J. D. Roberts, ‘The Politics of Professionalization: MPs, Medical Men, and the 1858 
Medical Act’, Medical History, 2009, 53, 37-56, on 39-43. 
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officially recognized medical qualifications. As a corollary to this latter function 
the Council was authorized to erase the names of those from the Register who 
had been wrongly placed on it; who had been convicted by a court of a 
misdemeanour (offence) or felony (crime); or who had been found guilty by the 
Council of ‘infamous conduct in any professional respect’.10 Drawing upon the 
Minutes of the General Council of Medical Education and Registration for the 
years 1859-1914, I argue that the disciplinary cases can give us a clue to 
contemporary standards of medical professional ethics.11 During this period the 
GMC dealt with over 400 such cases.12 Legal and quantitative analysis of the 
GMC’s cases from 1859 up to 1990 by Russell G. Smith has led to the criticism 
that the Council sometimes disciplined medical practitioners before giving them 
specific ethical guidance on the issue concerned.13 However, the disciplinary 
cases, when read in greater detail and in their specific contexts, do reveal the 
‘ethical compass’ of the Council’s physicians and surgeons who had been 
invested with the state’s authority to decide on the professional fate of other 
medical practitioners. Referring to a variety of cases, ranging from fraudulent 
registration, sexual misconduct, and breach of confidence to alleged negligence 
in post-mortem examination, covering of unqualified assistants, and advertising, I 
                                                 
10 Walter Pyke-Lees, Centenary of the General Medical Council 1858-1958: The History and 
Present Work of the Council (London: William Clowes & Sons, [1958]), 1-4. 
11 Minutes of the General Council of Medical Education and Registration of the United Kingdom 
(London: W. J. & S. Golbourn, 1863ff). Hereafter cited as Minutes. 
12 Russell G. Smith, Medical Discipline: The Professional Conduct Jurisdiction of the General 
Medical Council, 1858-1990 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 238-55. 
13 Ibid., 57, 70; R. G. Smith, ‘The Development of Ethical Guidance for Medical Practitioners by 
the General Medical Council’, Medical History, 1993, 37, 56-67, 63; R. G. Smith, ‘Legal Precedent 
and Medical Ethics: Some Problems Encountered by the General Medical Council in Relying 
upon Precedent when Declaring Acceptable Standards of Professional Conduct’, in Robert Baker, 
ed., The Codification of Medical Morality, vol. 2: Anglo-American Medical Ethics and Medical 
Jurisprudence in the Nineteenth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 205-18, 
212. 
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suggest that the medical men of the General Council tried to implement values 
that lay in patients’ as well as doctors’ interests. 
 
The General Medical Council and Its Register 
 
Before going into specific cases we need to clarify who the members of the GMC 
were who sat in judgement over their colleagues. Initially the Council comprised 
twenty-four members: nine represented the medical Royal Colleges of London, 
Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dublin, the Society of Apothecaries in London, and the 
Apothecaries’ Hall in Dublin; seven represented the four English and three Irish 
universities and two the four Scottish universities; and six were nominated by the 
Queen on the advice of her Privy Council. All members were medically qualified 
men and can be seen as representing the professional establishment of the 
time.14 Only after a new Medical Act in 1886, five additional members were 
directly elected by the registered medical practitioners of the United Kingdom, a 
step which reflected the increased importance of general practice at that time.15 It 
also became then a requirement for registration that practitioners had certified 
proficiency in all the three main branches, ‘medicine, surgery and midwifery’, 
rather than just in medicine and/or surgery.16 In the period that I am looking at, 
1858 to 1914, the General Medical Council had nine Presidents - eminent 
physicians or surgeons, from Sir Benjamin Brodie (term of office 1858-1860)  to 
                                                 
14 Pyke-Lees, Centenary, 3; Anne Digby, The Evolution of General Practice 1850-1948 (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 39.  
15 Donald MacAlister, ‘The General Medical Council: Its Powers and Its Work’, British Medical 
Journal, 1906, 2 (2388), 817-23, 820. 
16 Roberts, ‘Politics of Professionalization’, 53. 
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Sir Donald MacAlister (term of office 1904-1931).17 By the early twentieth 
century, the Crown and the universities could appoint laymen to the Council, but 
did not choose to do so until 1926. From the 1880s, however, it became 
customary that the Council’s solicitor and a barrister, as Legal Assessor, were 
present during disciplinary proceedings, and the accused medical practitioners 
also brought (or sent) their defence lawyers. The disciplinary proceedings thus 
adopted a format that was similar to court proceedings.18 Britain was not alone in 
institutionalising medical discipline in this quasi-legal manner; Prussia, for 
example, legally introduced so-called medical courts of honour for this purpose in 
1899.19 
 
The preamble of the 1858 Medical Act stated that its purpose was to enable 
‘persons requiring medical aid […] to distinguish qualified from unqualified 
practitioners’.20 That was in essence the function of the Medical Register, on 
which only those practitioners were admitted who held a recognized qualification 
from one of the above-mentioned licensing institutions represented on the 
Council, or who had been practising medicine in 1815. In 1859, almost 15,000 
names were on this register, and the number increased to about 23,000 by 1880, 
                                                 
17 Pyke-Lees, Centenary, 30. Brodie had demonstrated his interest in medical professional ethics 
long before his appointment as President of the General Council, see Benjamin Brodie, 
‘Introductory Discourse on the Duties and Conduct of Medical Students and Practitioners. 
Addressed to the Students of St. George’s Hospital, October 2, 1843’, in The Works of Sir 
Benjamin Collins Brodie, collected and arranged by Charles Hawkins, 3 vols (London: Longman, 
Green etc., 1865), I, 485-505  
18 MacAlister, ‘General Medical Council’, 820; Smith, ‘Legal Precedent’, 207.  
19 See Andreas-Holger Maehle, Doctors, Honour and the Law: Medical Ethics in Imperial 
Germany (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 6-46. 
20 Cited in MacAlister, ‘General Medical Council’, 817. 
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and c. 50,000 by 1924.21 Being unregistered, however, did not prevent someone 
from practising medicine. Registration was only required for fulfilling official 
functions, such as issuing a death certificate, or for holding positions in public 
employment, e.g. serving as a medical officer or practising under the 1911 
National Health Insurance scheme. Also, only registered practitioners were 
entitled to sue in the courts for their fees.22 Nevertheless, the prestige and 
professional legitimacy that registration brought are not only reflected in the rising 
numbers of registered practitioners but also in disciplinary cases in which 
practitioners erased from the Register keenly sought to have their names 
restored. For example, Leeds doctor Henry Arthur Allbutt, who had been struck 
off in 1887 for publishing a booklet including contraceptive advice which was 
considered detrimental to ‘public morals’, took the General Council to court to 
have his name placed back on the Register and seeking damages for libel.23 
Other practitioners wrote to the Council with long apologies or detailed 
                                                 
21 Pyke-Lees, Centenary, 3. According to Digby an important reason for the increase in the 
numbers of registered practitioners was the growing number of graduate entrants in the Register; 
by 1913 the total number of practitioners on the Register had reached about 42,000. Cf. Digby, 
Making a Medical Living, 15-16.  
22 MacAlister, ‘General Medical Council’, 817; Margaret Stacey, Regulating British Medicine: The 
General Medical Council (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1992), 18-19; Roberts, ‘Politics of 
Professionalization’, 47.   
23 Minutes, vol. 24, 1887, 122-23, 307-13, 316-17; vol. 26, 1889, 181-83. The publication 
concerned was Arthur H. Albutt, The Wife’s Handbook: How a woman should order herself during 
Pregnancy, in the Lying-in Room, and after Delivery, 2nd edn (London: W. J. Ramsey, 1886). 
Chapter VII (46-50) gave details of various contraceptive techniques and devices, including the 
names of the firms from where to obtain the latter. Advertisements for the devices, such as ‘The 
Improved Check Pessary’ and ‘Malthusian Appliance – The Improved Vertical and Reverse 
Syringe’, appeared at the end of the booklet. For further details and the neo-Malthusian context of 
the Allbutt case see Angus McLaren, Birth Control in Nineteenth-Century England (New York: 
Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1978), 112, 132-33.                
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justifications of the conduct that had led to erasure of their names, hoping to 
have them restored.24 
 
Examples of Disciplinary Cases and Their Interpretation 
 
It is therefore unsurprising that a series of early disciplinary cases were 
concerned with fraudulent registration, i.e. with practitioners who falsely declared 
to have a registrable qualification or tried to obtain one by fraud.  If the Council 
found practitioners guilty of such an offence, they were erased from the 
Register.25 While these decisions were recorded without much comment one can 
safely assume that the Council aimed to fulfil here its task of enabling the public 
to identify qualified practitioners. One might, of course, also take the more 
sceptical line of interpreting those erasures as a process of professional 
boundary demarcation from the ‘unqualified’, carried out in the economic interest 
of the ‘qualified’ practitioners. The issue of fraud in medical titles was as such not 
new: already in the early 1850s there had been complaints about this matter in 
connection with the publication of the (unofficial) British Medical Directory.26   
 
It would be rash, however, to view the early disciplinary cases simply as 
expressions of professional self-interest. In 1873, for example, the Council 
erased a medical doctor from the Register because of sexual relations with a 
                                                 
24 See e.g. Minutes, vol. 19, 1882, 83-85 (following erasure in 1877 because of criminal 
conviction for attempted sodomy); vol. 33, 1896, 232-37 (following erasure in 1894 for advertising 
for a company). On the latter case (Herbert Tibbits), see below.   
25 See e.g. Minutes, vol. 1, 1863, 94-97, 103-104, 213, 245, 251; vol. 2, 1864, 341-42 
26 ‘Fictitious Medical Titles’, The Lancet, 21 August 1852, 179. 
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female patient. The initial complaint, that he had ‘seduced and carnally known’ 
her, had been made by the patient’s uncle, a solicitor.27 The doctor’s petition, two 
years later, to have his name restored to the Register was rejected, as was his 
further request to this effect in the following year.28 Only at the third attempt, after 
a total of eleven years, was his named restored.29 This was a typical case of 
‘infamous conduct in a professional respect’ that constituted a violation of moral 
standards of the medical profession in relation to patients. The rule against 
sexual relations with patients had already been part of the Hippocratic Oath.30 It 
was also behind the vow to practise ‘chastely’ in Edinburgh University’s Medical 
Oath, which had been sworn since the early 1730s.31 In the moralistic climate of 
the nineteenth century the rule aimed both at protecting patients and at 
preventing reputational damage to the profession.32 Seen in this light it is 
understandable that the GMC in this disciplinary case repeatedly rejected the 
doctor’s application to restore his name to the Register – taking a firm line in a 
matter like this protected the GMC’s own reputation.  
 
Another early GMC case concerned medical confidentiality – a rule likewise 
mentioned in the Hippocratic Oath, but also in nineteenth-century British works 
on medical deontology, such as Percival’s Medical Ethics and Michael Ryan’s A 
                                                 
27 Minutes, vol. 10, 1872-73, 149-50. 
28 Minutes, vol. 12, 1875, 23; vol. 13, 1876, 333. 
29 Smith, Medical Discipline, 240. 
30 ‘Into as many houses as I may enter, I will go for the benefit of the ill, while being far from all 
voluntary and destructive injustice, especially from sexual acts, both upon women’s bodies and 
upon men’s, both of the free and of the slaves.’ See Steven H. Miles, The Hippocratic Oath and 
the Ethics of Medicine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), xiv, 139-48.  
31 Robert Baker, Before Bioethics: A History of American Medical Ethics from the Colonial Period 
to the Bioethics Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 37, 49. 
32 See also Digby, Evolution of British General Practice, 282.  
12 
 
Manual of Medical Jurisprudence.33 This case concerned a medical doctor, John 
Pattison, who had qualified in New York but was practising in London. In 1868, 
he had accused the husband of a patient with breast cancer of ‘stubbornness’, 
because he had refused to follow the doctor’s advice to take her after local 
treatment of the tumour for recuperation to the south of France over the winter 
months. Instead the husband eventually took her at the end of January to the 
seaside at Hastings, where she died a few days later. The doctor was further 
aggrieved by the fact that the husband refused to pay the full bill for numerous 
home visits to the sick wife, and he warned the husband in writing that he was 
going to publish the circumstances and details of the case in a medical book.34 
When the husband returned the doctor’s letters, which included accusations of 
‘shabby conduct’, to the dead-letter office, Pattison sent them by open post, so 
that they could be read by anyone, and threatened that he would next time write 
them on cardboard and send them to the husband’s club. The husband, Charles 
Hay Frewen, a Royal sheriff and former Member of Parliament, took the doctor to 
court for libel and breach of the peace.35 At the second court hearing Pattison 
apologized through his lawyer to Frewen and assured to have published his book 
without including the case history concerned. Frewen’s lawyer then withdrew the 
                                                 
33 ‘And about whatever I may see or hear in treatment, or even without treatment, in the life of 
human beings – things that should not ever be blurted out outside – I will remain silent, holding 
such things to be unutterable.’ See Miles, Hippocratic Oath, xiv, 149-57. Percival, ‘Medical 
Ethics’, 90; Michael Ryan, ‘A Manual of Medical Jurisprudence and State Medicine’ (1836), in H. 
Brody, Z. Meghani and K. Greenwald, eds, Michael Ryan’s Writings on Medical Ethics 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 79-222, 157-58. 
34 Minutes, vol. 7, 1869, 41-45. 
35 ‘Court of Queen’s Bench, Westminster, Jan. 25’, The Times, issue 26344, 26 January 1869, 
11. 
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charges, so that the court, somewhat reluctantly, dismissed the case.36 However, 
the General Medical Council, on learning about this court case from newspaper 
reports, decided to hold its own inquiry into the matter, found Pattison guilty of 
infamous conduct in a professional respect and erased his name in 1869 from 
the Register. His petition in 1871 to have his name restored was rejected by the 
Council.37 The sparse GMC Minutes unfortunately give us no information about 
the Council’s reasoning behind their decisions. However, it is clear that the 
deontological literature, in particular Percival and Ryan, had described 
unauthorized disclosures as unethical. As Ryan had put it in 1836: 
 
The confidence reposed in him [i.e. the medical practitioner], and 
revelations made to him, during his professional attendance, are such that 
honour commands him not to abuse the one, or publish the other, unless 
in our courts of justice, which have the power to compel him. […] such 
secrets are not to be divulged without the greatest necessity […].38 
 
Russell Smith has identified Pattison’s case as the GMC’s first disciplinary case 
on medical confidentiality, and deplores that the GMC began to publish guidance 
on this topic only over a hundred years later.39 However, it is quite clear from the 
context of the case that the Council acted on a contemporary, professional as 
well as public expectation about the requirements of discreet behaviour in a 
                                                 
36 ‘Court of Queen’s Bench, Westminster, Feb. 1’, The Times, issue 26350, 2 February 1869, 8-9. 
37 Minutes, vol. 7, 1869, 41-45, 159, 162; vol. 9, 1871, 14. 
38 Ryan, ‘Manual’, 157. 
39 Smith, ‘Legal Precedent’, 211. Actually, GMC Legal Assessor Muir Mackenzie prepared a 
memorandum on the obligations of medical practitioners regarding professional secrecy in 1899 
which was published in the British Medical Journal and The Lancet. Cf. Angus H. Ferguson, 
Should a Doctor Tell? The Evolution of Medical Confidentiality in Britain (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2013), 28, 37-38; Andreas-Holger Maehle, Contesting Medical Confidentiality: Origins of the 
Debate in the United States, Britain, and Germany (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2016), 30.   
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doctor and enforced this social expectation through its decisions. In 1851, the 
Scottish Court of Sessions case of A.B. v. C.D., in which a doctor was accused of 
having disclosed sensitive family information of the plaintiff to the minister of his 
parish, had established that the relationship between medical adviser and the 
person consulting him implied an obligation of secrecy that, If violated, could give 
proper grounds for legal action. Only in a court of law doctors were expected, 
and compelled, to testify concerning patient details.40 In Pattison’s case, then, the 
GMC acted on the supposed interests of the patient respectively their family in 
medical secrecy. These interests were apparently not in conflict with professional 
interests which were concerned about the public reputation of medical 
practitioners. 
 
Another case indicated, however, the limits of the GMC’s disciplinary role. In April 
1881, the King and Queen’s College of Physicians in Ireland sent a complaint 
about Richard Albert Shipman Prosser, a Member of the Royal College of 
Surgeons of England and Licentiate of the Society of Apothecaries in London, to 
the General Medical Council. Prosser had sworn in a coroner’s court that he had 
performed a post-mortem examination on a female patient’s body, in which he 
examined the kidneys and all other abdominal viscera, finding the kidneys 
healthy. On the basis of this examination, he had accused the medical 
practitioner who had treated the patient of having caused her death by 
negligence. On this evidence the practitioner concerned, Edward Hyacinth 
                                                 
40  Walter F. Pratt, Privacy in Britain (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, and London: 
Associated University Presses, 1979), 46-47; Ferguson, Should a Doctor Tell?, 24-26; and 
Maehle, Contesting Medical Confidentiality, 9-10. 
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O’Leary, a Licentiate of the King and Queen’s College of Physicians, had been 
charged with manslaughter and imprisoned. A second-post mortem examination 
by two other medical practitioners then showed, however, that the kidneys had 
not been removed from their place during the autopsy and that also the other 
abdominal organs appeared to have been incompletely examined. Following this 
information the manslaughter charge against O’Leary was dropped, and he was 
released from prison. King and Queen’s College held that Prosser’s behaviour 
amounted to infamous conduct in a professional respect and asked the GMC to 
erase his name from the Register.41 So in this case, Prosser, who had made the 
accusation of negligence about a fellow-practitioner, was himself suspected of 
having been negligent, namely in his post-mortem examination, with the serious 
consequence that the practitioner accused by him had been indicted with 
manslaughter and arrested.42 
 
The initial response of the GMC Branch Council for England, which first looked at 
the complaint, was that this case did not seem to be one in which the Council 
could ‘usefully take action’. King and Queen’s College, dissatisfied with this reply, 
repeated its complaint in May 1881. The Branch Council was still unwilling to 
take the matter further, seeing it as a case of ‘conflicting evidence’ and noting 
that no legal action had been taken against Prosser for perjury. However, the 
central General Medical Council decided that the Branch Council should inquire 
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further into Prosser’s conduct in this case.43 Having obtained and considered 
their solicitor’s report on the case and having consulted with the General 
Council’s solicitor, the Branch Council concluded eventually, in March 1883, 
nearly two years after the initial complaint, that there were no grounds for finding 
Prosser guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect.44 In spite of the 
intervention of two GMC members, who wanted to see the report of the second 
post-mortem examination, the General Medical Council agreed with this 
conclusion the following month.45   
 
Apart from throwing a light on the power relations between a royal college, the 
General Medical Council and one of its branch councils, the Prosser case 
illustrates the difficulties the GMC had early on in forming an opinion on the 
quality of medical performance. The reference to ‘conflicting evidence’ is quite 
revealing in this regard. In the end, the GMC followed the legal assessments of 
its solicitors, which in turn were informed by the decisions of the general courts 
involved. It summoned neither Prosser nor O’Leary to hear them directly about 
their sides of the case, whereas it had summoned the accused practitioners in 
the sexual misconduct and breach of confidentiality cases mentioned above. So 
how did the early GMC then address its task of protecting the public against 
poorly performing medical practitioners, as distinct from practitioners whose 
moral conduct was questionable? 
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Two Major Issues: Covering Unqualified Assistants and Medical Advertising 
 
As the mentioned cases on fraudulent registration indicated, the GMC’s 
approach focused on medical qualifications, and in fact the related matter of 
covering unqualified assistants became a key issue in the late nineteenth 
century. The problem was, in short, that some qualified medical men, who ran 
large practices, employed unqualified assistants (that is, assistants without a 
registrable qualification), allowing them to do unsupervised work which was 
supposed only to be carried out by a qualified medical practitioner. Such 
assistants sometimes gave the wrong impression to patients that they were 
regular doctors.46 A GMC Committee looking into substantial evidence on this 
issue concluded in 1883 that the system of employing unqualified assistants was 
widespread in England and Wales, especially in general practice for the large 
mining and manufacturing populations. The Committee expressed concern that 
this system was blocking employment opportunities and earnings for qualified 
assistants. But above all it saw the system as ‘fraud on the public’, comparable to 
the public offence of lawyers who covered persons falsely pretending to be a 
solicitor or attorney, which was punishable with withdrawal of the lawyer’s 
practising license and a prison sentence for the unqualified person. The qualified 
medical practitioners who covered an unqualified assistant, for example by 
signing medical or death certificates on patients they had not seen themselves, 
were held to be guilty of ‘infamous conduct’. Their behaviour frustrated the 
fundamental principle of the 1858 Medical Act that it should enable the public to 
                                                 
46 Minutes, vol. 21, 1884, 252; vol. 23, 1886, 117. 
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distinguish between qualified and unqualified practitioners.47 So, in this matter 
the GMC aimed to protect the public against incompetent treatment, though not 
by control of performance but indirectly by control of medical employment. It 
acted here in the interest of the public, while simultaneously supporting the 
employment opportunities for junior, qualified practitioners. 
 
The Committee’s recommendation to discipline practitioners who covered 
unqualified assistants was adopted by the GMC, which decided to publish a 
warning on this issue in the same year, 1883.48 This was the first of the GMC’s 
official Warning Notices, which specified types of behaviour that might lead to a 
disciplinary inquiry and erasure from the Register.49 Numerous charges of 
covering unqualified assistants were heard by the GMC until this type of 
disciplinary offence became less frequent in the years after 1900.50 A particularly 
prominent case of this kind was that of Dr Walter Day and Mr William Davenport 
in 1886. It had been reported by the Deputy Coroner for Westminster, Athelstan 
Braxton Hicks, to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, before the 
latter forwarded the material to the GMC, asking the Council to deal with it, ‘as 
the practice of employing unqualified practitioners as assistants by medical men 
is very common, especially by medical men presiding over dispensaries.’51 A 
coroner’s inquest had been held over the body of a 53-year-old labourer, as Dr 
                                                 
47 Minutes, vol. 20, 1883, 39-45, 51-85. 
48 Minutes, vol. 20, 1883, 91. 
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50 Smith, Medical Discipline, 103, 241-55. 
51 Minutes, vol. 23, 1886, 114. 
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John Pugh, who had been called by the family for emergency help in the night 
the man was dying, suspected that the patient had only been treated in his last 
illness by an unqualified practitioner, Davenport, who worked as an assistant in 
Dr Day’s dispensary. Pugh had therefore refused to give a death certificate and 
written to the Registrar of Deaths. Dr Day had subsequently signed the death 
certificate wrongly entering as the last date he had seen the patient the day on 
which Davenport had actually attended him. However, Day claimed to have 
personally seen to the patient in the dispensary two days earlier when the latter 
had presented with symptoms of acute bronchitis. While the post-mortem 
examination did not reveal anything suspicious, indicating heart failure upon 
congestion of the lungs, and Davenport’s treatment appeared to have been 
appropriate, the coroner was alarmed about the circumstances of the death 
certificate, in particular as Davenport had a previous conviction for perjury. 
Concerned about ‘the poor’ being treated by unqualified men who were unable to 
give valid certificates for their insurance clubs, Braxton Hicks had informed the 
Home Secretary. The latter had subsequently consulted the Registrar-General, 
who advised against taking legal action against Dr Day, given that he had 
declared under oath to have personally seen the patient only two days before the 
patient’s death.52 Braxton Hick’s involvement as coroner and the holding of an 
inquest over the patient’s body was in line with a general, though not 
uncontroversial policy at this time: that all deaths not certified by a registered 
medical practitioner should be referred to the coroner, who would then decide 
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whether an inquest should be held.53 As Ian Burney has argued, the threat to a 
deceased person’s family of the unwanted publicity of a coroner’s inquest can be 
seen as an instrument of the medical profession to discipline the population into 
seeking qualified medical care and avoiding unlicensed practitioners.54 While this 
interpretation points to professional self-interest in cases such as this, there 
appears to have also been genuine concern about the quality of care provided by 
unqualified assistants such as Davenport. The General Medical Council, upon 
advice of its solicitor, decided to take no action against Dr Day, but took the 
opportunity to inform the Home Department and the Privy Council about the 
recent GMC inquiry into the issue of employing unqualified assistants, including 
the subsequent Warning Notice of 1883 and a resolution then taken to ask for 
legislation on the matter.55 It also defined more clearly the circumstances under 
which a registered practitioner might be ‘censured’ for covering an unqualified 
assistant. This was held to be likely if the unqualified assistant practised ‘in 
complete substitution’ for the registered practitioner’s services or under 
circumstances where ‘due personal supervision and control’ by the latter were 
not, or could not be, exercised.56 
 
The implications of this position of the GMC are illustrated by another disciplinary 
case on covering an unqualified assistant, in 1910. Being the first case in which 
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54 Ibid., 77. 
55 Minutes, vol. 23, 1886, 256; vol. 24, 1887, 143-44, 357. 
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the British Medical Association acted as official complainant to the GMC, it 
received detailed coverage in the British Medical Journal.57 As the BMA’s 
Medical Secretary, James Smith Whitaker, asserted in the relevant GMC 
hearing, ‘the case was of considerable public importance’.58 David Thomas 
Jones, a qualified surgeon running a large practice with three partners in 
Sheffield, stood accused of having allowed his medically unqualified dispenser 
and surgery attendant, William Perry, to attend one of his working-class patients, 
Mrs Alice Hannah Nicholson, when she gave birth to twins. Initially, Perry had 
rushed to see to Mrs Nicholson in an emergency situation, as she had started to 
give birth and neither Jones nor the other doctors of the practice had been 
available at the time. However, Jones being busy the following days as well, 
allowed his assistant to visit her two more times after the birth, which appeared to 
have been uncomplicated, and also to take care of the official notification of birth 
form, in which Perry inserted Jones’s name as the doctor attending. When Jones 
eventually followed a call to personally visit Mrs Nicholson four days after the 
birth, she had developed puerperal fever. Though transferred immediately to a 
local workhouse infirmary, where retained pieces of placenta were removed, she 
died there a few days later. On learning about the case, Sheffield’s Medical 
Officer of Health contacted the coroner, who – following also a personal request 
of the widower, Mr Nicholson – arranged for an exhumation of the already buried 
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body. The post-mortem examination indicated that Mrs Nicholson had died from 
‘purely natural causes’, which ‘would include puerperal septicaemia [blood 
poisoning]’,59 and that there were no injuries caused by the delivery. Still, the 
Medical Officer of Health ensured that the case went, via the British Medical 
Association as complainant, to the GMC.60 After hearing Jones and witnesses, 
and considering depositions from individuals involved in the case, the GMC 
found Jones guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect and erased his 
name from the Register.61 His name was restored 30 months later.62                
 
The Day-Davenport case and the Jones-Perry case thus illustrate how the issue 
of employing unqualified assistants was bound up with suspicions of incompetent 
practice - even though in the former case family members of the deceased 
declared during the inquest that they had always been satisfied with ‘Dr 
Davenport’, and in the latter case, Jones provided evidence that members of Mrs 
Nicholson’s family had continued to see him as their doctor after her death.63 
Employing and covering unqualified assistants was seen as a professional 
offence not only because it precluded employment opportunities for qualified 
junior practitioners but also because it could involve serious danger for patients. 
By the mid-1920s the position of the GMC on the issue was unmistakably clear. 
As barristers William Sanderson and E. B. A. Rayner warned in their textbook on 
legal aspects of medical practice: 
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The General Medical Council regards the employment of an unqualified 
person as an assistant, as fraudulent and dangerous to the public interest, 
and will take every step in its power to prevent or punish practitioners who 
act in contravention of this rule. The Council is equally determined to 
suppress the practice of “covering,” by which expression is meant 
countenancing or assisting an unqualified or unregistered person to attend 
or treat patients.64  
 
                 
When, in 1906, GMC President Donald MacAlister commented on the influence 
of the Council on the development of medical professional ethics, he cited the 
issue of covering unqualified assistants as an example of effective intervention.65 
His other example was the issue of medical advertising, on which the GMC had 
expressed its disapproval in a resolution in 1899.66 In late nineteenth-century 
Britain medical advertising in newspapers and other forms of attracting patients, 
such as distribution of handbills or canvassing through health insurance 
societies, had become increasingly prevalent, linked to relative overcrowding of 
the profession and competition between practitioners. The medical establishment 
of the GMC, however, saw advertising as potentially ‘infamous conduct’: not only 
was it perceived as unfair competition, but coming from the world of trade, 
standing in the tradition of quackery, and often being linked with unorthodox 
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treatments, it was regarded as profoundly ungentlemanly and as endangering the 
profession’s reputation.67 
 
The issue had been long-standing. Since the late 1850s the Lancet had regularly 
published complaints of medical practitioners about colleagues’ ‘unprofessional’ 
circulars or frequently repeated newspaper advertisements for their services or 
book publications, and it had commented that such tradesman-like conduct was 
lowering the profession’s standing in the eyes of the public.68 In 1871 a Lancet 
editorial complained that the medical corporations, in particular the Royal College 
of Surgeons of England and the Royal College of Physicians of London, did too 
little to discipline such behaviour of their fellows, members and licentiates, 
although they had appropriate powers and structures to do so.69 By 1873 the 
Royal College of Surgeons had adopted a resolution condemning frequent 
advertising of medical works in the non-medical press, and the Royal College of 
Physicians had endorsed this resolution.70 Also, the various forms of advertising 
were unmistakably censured in the medical deontological literature. As  
Jukes Styrap pointed out in his A Code of Medical Ethics: 
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It is […] derogatory to the profession to solicit practice by advertisement, 
circular, card, or placard; also, to offer, by public announcement, 
gratuitous advice to the poor, or to promise radical cures; to publish cases 
and operations in the daily press, or knowingly, to suffer such publications 
to be made; to advertise medical works in non-medical papers; to invite 
laymen to be present at operations; to boast of cures and remedies; to 
adduce testimonials of skill and success; or to do any like acts. Such are 
the ordinary practices of charlatans, and are incompatible with the honour 
and dignity of the profession. […] It is also extremely reprehensible for a 
practitioner to attest the efficacy of patent or secret medicines, or, in any 
way, to promote their use; only less culpable is the practice of written 
testimony in favour of articles of commerce, and tacitly or otherwise 
sanction its publication.71  
 
However, the issue of medical advertising continued to cause concern. In 1879 
the Lancet noted that scarcely a week passed ‘without receiving communications 
from medical men who are annoyed by the paltry and unprofessional devices to 
which some of their neighbours resort to obtain public notice and “patronage”.’72 
Unwilling to keep on publishing about individual cases of this kind, the journal 
resigned itself to the hope that the public would ‘in the long run discover that the 
persons and the commodity that need so much advertising cannot be of great 
value or repute.’73 
 
The Medical Press and Circular, however, took on the cause, pointing out in 
1882 that a recent resolution by the Royal College of Physicians against 
advertising medical works in the lay press would remain entirely ineffective as 
long as the only consequence for perpetrators was loss of professional esteem. 
Only if the punishment consisted in loss of license, membership or fellowship of 
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the College, a measure that would then also be adopted by the other medical 
corporations, medical advertising would be stamped out.74 Similarly, when the 
King and Queen’s College of Physicians in Ireland passed later in the same year 
a resolution that described extensive advertising of medical works and giving 
‘laudatory certificates’ of medicinal preparations and medical or surgical 
appliances as ‘misleading to the public, derogatory to the dignity of the 
profession’, and contrary to the College’s traditions, the Medical Press criticized it 
as too vague and as ‘impotent’.75 
 
Yet, despite such worries, disciplinary action was taken in several cases. In 
1887, for example, the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland and the King and 
Queen’s College of Physicians reported to the General Medical Council that they 
had withdrawn their diplomas from a practitioner, William Edward Robson, ‘for 
having wilfully violated their regulations by publishing advertisements derogatory 
to the reputation, honour and dignity of the College’.76 His name was erased from 
the GMC’s Register but restored after 33 months.77 A leading article in the 
Medical Press in the same year, 1887, pointed out that problematic self-
advertisement occurred among professionally established practitioners as well as 
‘the young and struggling’, and was ‘derogatory’ anywhere, but ‘doubly so when 
the daily bread is no longer at stake’.78 In fact, in the following year a 
correspondent to the Medical Press accused even a member of the General 
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Medical Council itself, the ophthalmic surgeon Robert Brudenell Carter, FRCS, of 
publishing a ‘glaring puff’ for his dexterity and skill in the Times and the Pall Mall 
Gazette.79 Prominent in the GMC Minutes of the 1890s was the case of Dr 
Herbert Tibbits, a proponent and practitioner of the then controversial method of 
electrotherapy with weak currents.80 The Royal College of Physicians of London 
had withdrawn his licentiateship and the Royal College of Physicians of 
Edinburgh his membership and fellowship, as he was deemed to have issued a 
‘laudatory certificate’ on appliances of the Medical Battery Company. Tibbits 
protested against their decision in a letter to the GMC, pointing out that he had 
merely made a pre-paid ‘Report’ to the Company after testing some of their 
appliances, but had not published the report himself.81 Nevertheless, the GMC 
decided to hold an inquiry into his conduct and in December 1894 found him 
guilty of ‘offences […] infamous in a professional respect’ and erased his name 
from the Register. His efforts in the following two years to have his name 
restored were unsuccessful.82 In Tibbits’ case it seems, the combination of 
product advertising (‘laudatory certificate’), a link to a manufacturing company, 
and his support for an unorthodox or at least rather marginal form of treatment, 
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went firmly against him.83 It should be noted though that the 1858 Medical Act did 
not permit to erase a practitioner’s name from the Register ‘on the grounds of his 
having adopted any Theory of Medicine or Surgery’.84             
 
Eventually, in 1905, a formal GMC Notice on advertising and canvassing 
described these methods as ‘contrary to the public interest and discreditable to 
the profession of medicine’ and warned that any practitioner resorting to such 
practices rendered himself liable to the charge of ‘infamous conduct in a 
professional respect’ and might have his name erased from the Register if found 
guilty.85 As GMC member and Vice-President of the British Medical Association, 
Robert Saundby, explained in his booklet Medical Ethics: A Guide to Professional 
Conduct in 1907: 
 
No medical practitioner should seek publicity by advertisement except in 
certain recognized ways, as to do so is to attempt to get practice by other 
than the legitimate means of proficiency in his profession and skill or 
success in dealing with his patients. The only advertisement to the public 
now permissible is the door-plate […].86 
 
Between 1900 and 1914 advertising and canvassing belonged to the most 
common disciplinary offences. From a total of 206 disciplinary cases dealt with 
                                                 
83 Advertising, in particular self-advertisement, had also provided the grounds for the erasure from 
the Register of naturopath and anti-vaccinationist doctor Thomas Richard Allinson in 1892; see 
Minutes, vol. 26, 1889, 211-18; vol. 29, 1892, 75, 79-81, 154. For a full discussion of Allinson’s 
case, see P. S. Brown, ‘Medically Qualified Naturopaths and the General Medical Council’, 
Medical History, 1991, 35, 50-77.   
84 Cited ibid., 54. 
85 Minutes, vol. 42, 1905, 249-50; Saundby, Medical Ethics, 129. See also MacAlister, ‘General 
Medical Council’, 819. 
86 Saundby, Medical Ethics, 3. 
29 
 
by the GMC during this period, 23 concerned advertising and 18 canvassing.87 
Again, as in the matter of covering unqualified assistants (which still concerned 
26 cases in the same period), the Council’s disciplinary stance derived not only 
from professional self-interest (i.e. the intention to mitigate competition) but also 
from a claim to protect the public against unscrupulous practice. As Saundby 
maintained, the lay public was unable to judge, for example, the value of 
advertised patent medicines, and he warned: 
 
If medical practitioners advertised […] [t]here would be in consequence a 
general lowering of the standard of the profession, its ranks would be 
crowded with sharp business men, and the true scientific worker would be 
elbowed out and starved, until the public found out, as it might do after 
long years, that a bold liar is not a trustworthy medical adviser […].88 
 
Conclusions 
 
From the variety of cases discussed in this paper it is clear that in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries the GMC was concerned about two broad matters: 
the moral conduct of practitioners and the safeguarding of qualified practice. 
Disciplinary actions in these areas were taken in the interest of patients and the 
public, based on the legal remit that was given to the Council in the Medical Act 
of 1858. Some of the measures taken, in particular against unqualified practice 
and against medical advertising, also favoured interests of qualified, orthodox 
and established practitioners, as one would expect from a body that was 
composed of this type of practitioners. A shortcoming of the GMC was that it had 
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no direct control over medical performance, only indirectly through the monitoring 
of educational standards and practitioners’ qualifications. To its credit, the GMC 
attempted through its disciplinary role to ensure that the public could receive 
treatment from trustworthy and competent medical practitioners. However, this 
system of professional self-regulation and discipline had serious weaknesses, as 
became obvious in the second half of the twentieth century, especially in the 
1990s with the Bristol paediatric heart surgery scandal and with the case of 
medical serial killer Harold Shipman.89 Since then, the GMC, for a time fearing for 
its continued existence, has made considerable efforts to ensure safe medical 
practice for the public, for example by creation of a Medical Practitioners Tribunal 
Service, which is still part of the GMC but answerable to Parliament, and by 
introducing a revalidation of practitioners scheme.90 The long-term effects of 
these changes, which were implemented from 2012, remain to be seen. 
However, from a historical perspective, it would be unfair to doubt the GMC’s 
foundational intention to serve the interests of patients and the public at large as 
well as to protect the interests of qualified medical practitioners. The practice of 
medical ethics in the nineteenth century, as reflected in the disciplinary activities 
of the GMC, was more patient-oriented than has been generally assumed in the 
age of bioethics. In that sense, the history of medicine suggests that modern 
bioethics was less of an innovation than has been claimed.      
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